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At the seventieth annual conference of the Society ofArchitectural Historians, held in Glasgow, we co-chaired a session titled “Evidence and Narrative in
Architectural History.”1 The purpose of this session was to
discover some of the practices widely used in the discipline,
especially those employed to manage two interrelated prob-
lems of particular interest: choosing evidence with which to
make arguments and developing structures for telling stories.
From the SAH session, as well as in future conferences and
workshops on these topics, we hope to seed a conversation
on writing history that will help the field become more self-
conscious about its use of evidence and narrative. Ultimately,
reconsideration of evidence and narrative will produce new and
different histories of architecture as well as reimagined agencies
for ourselves as writers, readers, teachers, and students.
Issues of evidence and narrative have always been part of
architectural history discursively, despite architectural histori-
ans’ general indifference. Yet there may be an institutional
timeliness to the intertwined themes. For architectural histor-
ians in art history departments, focusing on narrative might
foster alliances with scholars in similarly concerned fields, like
history, literature, and philosophy, strengthening architectural
history’s identity and legitimacy within the humanities and the
academy. For architectural historians in architecture schools,
focusing on evidence can create links with the sciences and
law, underscoring the field’s validity for professional practices
that rely on the legitimating capacity of objective knowledge.
Insofar as architectural history sits between these two sources
of institutional power, by considering the reciprocal depen-
dencies of evidence and narrative in our writing, we can give
our work the capacity to make this dynamic explicit.
Architectural historians find evidence everywhere. We
mine built and unbuilt projects alike, textual and visual docu-
ments of all kinds, and findings of other fields. Quantitative
data, too, have recently entered the field—plural and standard-
ized information, in contrast to more singular facts. Evidence
is what demonstrates, proves, or attests to the truth claims of
a historical narrative. However, transforming the epistemic
unit called “fact” into evidence requires marshaling it in the
service of an argument, as historian LorraineDaston observes.
Yet facts remain “notoriously inert—‘angular,’ ‘stubborn,’ or
even ‘nasty’ in their resistance to interpretation and infer-
ence.” In Daston’s telling, facts—etymologically related to an
action or deed already completed—are unique and “robust in
their existence and opaque in their meaning.”2 Daston, as a
historian of early modern science, reads the resistance of
facts to immediate understanding as the basis for legitimat-
ing scientists’ later claims to objective knowledge, in that a
fact’s presumed existence prior to the observer’s engagement
guarantees the fact’s immunity from distortion. Objectivity,
based on this understanding of fact, was developed as an
“epistemic virtue” for controlling potentially untrustworthy
conclusions from scientists who might be tempted by their
overactive subjective selves.3 Valorizing fact, reality, and
knowledge and the related suppression of value, fiction, and
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the subjective self have similarly underwritten historians’
claims to objectivity.4
How do we mobilize, specifically, the visual material we
use to understand architecture in our arguments as evidence?
Like textual evidence, the visual material through which we
access form is discontinuous and inconclusive when it stands
alone. Historical arguments must transform such elements
through a conjectural analysis of form, as in art and architec-
tural historians’ privileged technique of side-by-side compar-
ison. These traditions of formal analysis in our field, so often
centered on comparing visual materials to give them mean-
ing, have not yet, we believe, found a theory of the value of
evidence. By contrast to claims to objectivity, formal analysis
often produces evidence from visual material by ascribing
subjective intention. That is, one typical practice of our disci-
pline relies on the power of connoisseurship to link drawings
to their creator—to the architect’s signature, practice, or
workshop.5 Against the stubbornness of facts to meaning, in-
voking an author gives the architectural historian access to a
biography to invest that individual’s creations with apparent
purposes. Furthermore, in the case of drawings, those made
by different authors may share similarities in form and there-
fore, by the historian’s light, borrow meaning from one an-
other and appear to produce continuities between projects
before and after. Yet these connections across space and time
are rarely made explicit in any one drawing, and the construc-
tion of such connections relies heavily on the historian’s
imagination.6
In this essay, we do not claim that fact-based objectivity
is any more or less important to an understanding of archi-
tecture than speculations derived from formal analysis.
This is not a call to a new empiricism that privileges one
form of evidence over another. Rather, by marking out dif-
ferences in the methods for producing evidence, we aim to
reveal the internal tensions in our historical practice. To
underscore the essentially interpretive, even political, work
of architectural history, which we see as a process of assem-
bling discontinuous elements of evidence into a story, we
turn to the matter of narrative. One of the chief means by
which we as historians give purposeful sense to our facts—
turn them into evidence—is by narrating them, that is to say,
putting them into a specific kind of chronological order.
Scholars in other fields have explored the role of narrative
in making evidence meaningful, but architectural historians
have done so to a lesser degree.7 Following historian Hayden
White’s definition of “narrativity,” we define narrative as
storytelling—evidence plotted into a beginning, middle, and
end, complete with turning points and a central subject, be it
a person, building, or concept.8 Awareness of narrativity
yields benefits to us as architectural history authors and read-
ers. In writing and teaching, harnessing storytelling’s persua-
sive powers strengthens our arguments, creating images of
coherence and fullness out of masses of undifferentiated facts,
even those that have been given evidentiary value.
Consciousness of narrativity allows us, too, as readers,
glimpses beneath surfaces, toward the politics underlying ev-
ery story. White suggests that “the demand for closure in the
historical story is a demand . . . for moral meaning.” He ar-
gues that “narrative in general . . . has to do with topics of law,
legality, legitimacy, or, more generally, authority.” Thus, at
the center of every narrative plotted as a story is a “politico-
social order,” no less so in architectural history, and every
ending is a pronouncement upon the world’s ideal.9
Analysis of narrative can reveal evidence turned for polit-
ical purposes, legitimating authority of one sort or another.
Yet narrative’s condition points as well to alternatives and
resistances. The selection of evidence to fit one story line
inescapably omits other potential evidence, which could be
used for a different story. Counternarratives are inevitably
invited, as facts, voices, and experiences are always left out,
undiscovered, excluded, waiting to be deployed in other sto-
ries. From the outset, then, “every narrative is also a coun-
ternarrative,” cultural theorist Martin McQuillan explains,
responding implicitly to some prior understanding and
ordering of the evidence. Continuing the chain, “as a
condition of its production a narrative will always initiate
a counternarrative.”10
Besides the marshaling of excluded evidence into different
stories against dominant narratives, evidence itself might be
rearranged to resist narrative’s totalizing effects and political
purposes. As White points out, stories with beginnings,
middles, and ends are not the only way to organize the past.
There are also annals and chronicles, lists of events without
closure or plot. In these instances—alternatives to the nar-
rative story form itself—evidence might maintain its sin-
gularity, its discontinuity, its independence apart from
all-encompassing narratives, a form of resistance to imposed
authority, which Foucault has called “genealogy” and “effec-
tive history”:
Genealogy does not pretend to go back in time to restore an
unbroken continuity . . . ; rather, it is an unstable assemblage of
faults, fissures, and heterogeneous layers. . . . “Effective” his-
tory deprives the self of the reassuring stability of life and na-
ture, and it will not permit itself to be transported by a
voiceless obstinacy toward a millennial ending. It will uproot its
traditional foundations and relentlessly disrupt its pretended
continuity.11
Such a form of history, which resists narrative certainty, in-
vites indeterminacy and even meaninglessness as alternative
politics in history writing. Joan Scott promotes composing
“undetermined history,” emphasizing accident and agency
over structure and teleology, so that the past’s contingency
models a similarly open future, not merely a continuing
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present.12 Resisting narrative’s impositions, accepting instead
facts’ or forms’ inherent “meaninglessness is the only invita-
tion that potentially oppositional and dissenting groups of his-
torians may get to challenge certaintist (e.g. fascist) history,”
declares historian Alun Munslow. “They, and we, empower
ourselves when we can find no objective certainty in the
past—in the sense of a factual correspondence with Truth—
that can be used to validate the authority of those in power
over us.”13
It is never enough to rethink evidence without narrative.
Architectural history needs counternarratives and alternatives
to narrative for numerous reasons. First, they can educate us
differently about the past’s heretofore obscured evidence and
meanings. Counternarratives can also free and inspire prac-
ticing architects to design differently. The politics of narra-
tive and evidence are not just contained within history but
are present, too, in our subjectivity as teachers and students,
authors and readers, inscribing relations of power and au-
thority. Facing up to narrative’s authoritarian impulses can
encourage us to write and instruct differently, loosening the
reins of narrative, inviting readers and students to more
open-ended engagements with evidence and our determina-
tion of its significance, questioning transmissions of power
and authority across texts and classrooms. At the same time,
we must acknowledge the benefits and desires of tightly plot-
ted, memorable story lines. They persuade and inspire. Can
the future, in other words, be liberated without convincing
narratives of the past?
Paradoxes, tensions, and choices within and between evi-
dence and narrative remain ultimately irresolvable; there is
no true path. Precisely, then, in the complex space of evi-
dence and narrative lies room for innovation and maneuver-
ing in architectural history—deploying new evidence, trying
different narratives and alternatives, testing combinations of
tactics, enacting other politics and subjectivities—if only we
understand first this multifarious terrain, evidence and narra-
tive always intertwined.
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